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The recent revolutions in Tunisia and Libya have brought the issue of trans-Mediterranean 
migration to the forefront of popular discussions about Europe’s relationship with its 
immediate neighbors in the Middle East and North Africa. It was on the back of hyperbolic 
and cataclysmic predictions of Europe being “swamped” by migrants that the case for 
intervention in Libya was partly made and following this, a number of EU member states 
have agreed on a temporary suspension of the Schengen Agreement. Schengen is an 
agreement that deals with the free movement of people throughout the European Union and 
was first signed on June 14, 1985 by five out of the ten members of what was then the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Five years later the Convention on Implementing 
the Schengen Agreement was signed and together these two treaties created what has 
become known as the Schengen Area or “Schengenland” in Europe. Implementation began 
in 1995 and in 1999 under the Amsterdam Treaty the rules governing Schengen became 
part of EU law. An area now encompassing some 4,312,099 km2 and 25 countries, Schengen 
has served to erase internal borders and allows for the free movement of people throughout 
the Schengen area for EU citizens and non-EU citizens alike, while simultaneously working 
to strengthen the external borders of the EU. Overall it is seen as one of the most important 
achievements of the European project. The decision in recent weeks by certain EU member 
states to suspend the Schengen Agreement means that passport free travel through all 
4,312,099 km2 of Schengenland is no longer possible, especially for non-EU citizens or 
those whose appearance may be interpreted as non-European. 
 
In turn, North Africa is considered a critical geopolitical location in worldwide migratory 
trends. It has become something of a bottleneck as migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and 
elsewhere travel north towards Europe, where they confront the Mediterranean. The 
Mediterranean in this regard is not just a geographic obstacle that claims the lives of 
hundreds of migrants every year; it is also a political obstacle, a fault-line, a space 
demarcating where Europe begins and ends, and as such the warm salty waters are imbued 
with considerable meaning and are the site of numerous political encounters between 
migrants and the soft (bureaucratic) and hard (military) power of Europe and Europe’s 
“fixers” in North Africa.  
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The suspension of Schengen is itself being met with similar levels of panic by the European 
Commission and European Union Policy Analysts as that directed towards the North 
African migrant “threat.” However, nothing has really changed in Europe’s approach to the 
issue of trans-Mediterranean migration since the revolutions. What has changed concerns 
the structural capacity of North African countries, specifically Tunisia and Libya, to manage 
sub-Saharan migration on behalf of the European Union and its member states, as well as an 
increase in media attention: the overall policy of the EU and individual states – the 
containment of migration south of the Mediterranean in third-party states, outside of 
Europe’s external borders – remains the same. 
 
In fact you could, and I would, argue that the recent revolutions in Tunisia and Libya and 
the subsequent threat of migrants “flooding” Europe are being used by the European Union 
as a neat hook on which to hang further consolidation of a pre-existing EU border policy, 
all the while simultaneously helping to bolster the EU’s liberal sense of self. For it has been 
argued by others elsewhere that EU foreign policy has always been more about the creation 
and consolidation of an EU identity through the outward projection of a set of norms than 
an effective policy for real structural engagement and change.  
 
For example on May 6, 2011 the European Commission (the executive of the EU) published 
an apparent response to the growing crisis: “Developing a Common Approach to 
Migration.” The article itself begins with the following call for expediency: “Since the 
beginning of this year, political unrest in North Africa has brought 25 000 migrants to EU 
shores – mainly in Italy and Malta.” However, expediency is not to outdo any attempt by 
Europe to bolster its liberal (to a degree) sense of self, so the above reference to current 
events and cause for panic is swiftly followed by: “The EU has a moral obligation to provide 
a safe haven for legitimate asylum seekers,” speedily followed by a call for further 
consolidation: “But the images of ramshackle boats and crowded beaches obscure the fact 
that it is also in Europe’s self-interest to have a more structured, comprehensive, longer-
term approach to asylum and migration.” 
 
Thought about in the round, the persistent presence of migration in European responses to 
the revolutions can be thought of in three principal ways: securitization, continuation and 
consolidation. 
 
Securitization 
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Over the past decade and a half in Europe and elsewhere, migrants have found themselves 
increasingly bound up within the wider process of securitization. The migrant, the refugee, 
the asylum seeker, the illegal immigrant, all are seen as synonymous and all are seen as a 
threat, a potential terrorist or simply just a threat. We live, as Doug Massey points out, in 
“anti-immigrant times.” The threat posed by migrants themselves does not have to be 
clearly defined; in fact, when those so keen to label migrants as a threat are pressed to 
expand on the exact threat migration and migrants themselves pose, the poverty of the label 
and the thinking behind it becomes clear. 
 
Within a wider climate of fear all that has to happen is for the migrant to be classified as a 
threat for the state to guard against the migrant and for the citizen to (supposedly) 
subsequently and logically fear migrants. When the fear-mongers are pressed to come up 
with solutions to a problem of their own making, again the poverty of their practice is 
revealed, a practice that includes outsourcing, containing, criminalizing and incarcerating 
migrants or removing them to somewhere else so that they become someone else’s problem. 
 
The European responses to the predicted influx of migrants from Tunisia and Libya have 
been ones of panic; Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has claimed that Italy will be “flooded” 
with half-a-million migrants, while the British Prime Minister David Cameron has 
repeatedly conflated trans-Mediterranean migration with security and Britain’s 
national/capitalist interest, couching it all in liberal interventionist terms. Speaking before 
Parliament on 14 March 2011 Cameron stated: “Do we want a situation where a failed 
pariah state festers in Europe’s southern border, potentially threatening our security, 
pushing people across the Mediterranean and creating a more dangerous and uncertain 
world for Britain and for all our allies as well as for the people of Libya?” Meanwhile the 
neoliberal interest behind British attitudes to the North African revolutions was plain to 
see: “Europe needs to follow through on its declaration with a real and credible offer to 
these countries based on three of the key freedoms – movement of goods, services and 
investment.” 
 
Noticeably while Cameron talks about the “movement of goods services and investment,” 
another key freedom and one that underpins Schengen, the free movement of people, is 
absent. The contradiction between the free flow of capital and the free flow of people was 
starkly illuminated by Cameron who in the same speech advocated for the free movement of 
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capital and at the same time warned against the movement of people in terms that paint 
migrants as an almost existential threat and seek to conflate migration with terrorism. For 
the idea of any movement of people from Europe’s southern neighbors creates a sense of 
panic as Cameron so ably demonstrated in a speech to Parliament on the eve of the US and 
European enforcement of the No-Fly Zone on 18 March 2011: “Libya will become... a state 
from which literally hundreds of thousands of citizens could seek to escape, putting huge 
pressure on us in Europe. We must also remember that Gaddafi is a dictator who has a track 
record of violence and support for terrorism against our country.” 
 
The sense of panic has been fuelled further by the decisions by Italy to issue temporary 
residency permits to North African migrants who had arrived in Italy before 5 April 2011, 
meaning that these migrants are now “technically” free under Schengen to travel anywhere 
within Schengenland. The threat of a tide of North African migrants marching north 
through the Italian peninsula like Garibaldi one hundred and fifty years ago has instigated 
alarm amongst European member states as far north as the Netherlands – where the Prime 
Minister Mark Rutte declared: “any Tunisian who got in through the Berlusconi 
arrangement must leave the Netherlands” – and Denmark, which, on 11 May 2011 decided 
to reintroduce border controls.  
 
The first member country to respond to the Italian granting of temporary residency to 
North African migrants was France, which has started border checks on the border with 
Italy and has blocked trains coming from Ventimiglia, including one on 17 April carrying 
300 migrants and NGO representatives. The suspension of Schengen is being interpreted 
by some policy analysts as a repressive policy response that has emerged in a context of 
widespread anti-immigration and xenophobic political discourses that, like David Cameron’s 
statements above, link human mobility with insecurity and criminality. 
 
However, issuing temporary residency permits and the suspension of Schengen are 
solutions that can only be implemented within European territory, inside the European 
Union. They are solutions that deal with migrants once they have breached the external 
borders and have penetrated European space. Ideally, in the first instance, member states 
and the EU would like to prevent the breaching of its external borders by migrants leaving 
North Africa. There have been media reports of naval crews of various European states 
leaving migrants to drift aimlessly in the Mediterranean. In late March, one vessel was left 
to drift for sixteen days, despite alarms raised with the Italian coast guard, resulting in 
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sixty-three migrants dying of thirst. There have been other reports of naval crews ignoring 
cries for help while taking photographs. The use of military vessels to deal – or not deal as 
the case may be – with migrant vessels in the Mediterranean is not a situation that Europe 
wishes to deal with itself. Can we be so cynical as to suggest that this is why European 
authorities have ignored migrant boats’ pleas for help? Migrants intercepted by European 
authorities often end up being taken to a European shore to be processed and have, 
therefore, succeeded in entering Europe. Ideally migrants need to be kept from European 
space. If North African authorities can intercept the migrant vessels the migrants can be 
returned to North Africa and the sanctity of Europe can be preserved. This requires 
equipment that Europe is only too happy to provide. On 11 May Italian Minister of the 
Interior Roberto Maroni announced that Italy was providing the new Tunisian regime with 
four light and fast naval vessels to, in the words of the Italian Interior Ministry, counter 
illegal immigration but also, the Interior Ministry said secondly, to save lives, with Italy’s 
priorities only too clear to see. 
 
Continuation 
 
This apparent dread at the possibility of “literally hundreds of thousands of escaping 
citizens” is not, however, an idea that is limited to the revolutionary moment. These 
practices existed long before Mohamed Bouazizi decided to set himself on fire on 17 
December 2010, the event credited with kick-starting the Tunisian revolution. The 
European responses to trans-Mediterranean migration witnessed in the last few months 
began a long time before this last winter.  
 
The outsourcing of migration control to third-party states in North Africa – Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya – began concomitantly with the Barcelona Process in 1995, and 
migration control remained a central pillar of the European Neighborhood Policy that 
replaced the Barcelona Process in 2004 and later the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008. 
Libya is not a member of the Union for the Mediterranean; however, EU-Libya engagement 
has been ongoing since 2004, and along with HIV, migration was one of two priority areas 
for engagement, as noted in the words of the EU’s Mid Term Review of its engagement 
with Libya: “both… constitute domestic political crises in Libya with implications for the 
EU.” Libya may be outside of the bureaucratic structure governing EU-Mediterranean 
relations, but, it was still very much considered a working partner; for example, since 2007, 
Libya has co-chaired along with Spain, the Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment 
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Partnership. In addition, Libya has developed bilateral relations with individual European 
states, especially Italy, and has received significant funding from both the European 
Union/Commission and Italy for the management of migrants before they reach Europe. 
 
This outsourcing of migration control by the European Union and individual member states 
to states south of the Mediterranean has seen the creation of an elaborate network of 
control designed to keep African migrants in Africa. In 2010 Libya alone had nineteen 
detention centers for the incarceration, processing, and removal of third country nationals. 
Tunisia had nine. This does not take account of the increasing use of the militaries of North 
African states in the prevention of migration. Italy providing Tunisia with four naval 
vessels to combat migration is not new. According to the International Boundaries 
Research Unit, in 2009 a secret deal was struck between Italy and Libya that saw €50 
million in funding given to Libya to patrol its 1,250 miles of coastline for migrants headed 
to the EU, and to take back migrants intercepted by the Italian coastguard. The system was 
intended to prevent migrants – mostly from Sub-Saharan Africa – from heading north 
across the Mediterranean and worked by capturing, holding, processing and returning those 
who managed to make the journey north. This system of control was located across Europe 
but importantly in North Africa with the backing of President Ben Ali in Tunisia and 
Colonel Gaddafi in Libya, and was designed to preserve the EU’s external borders and to 
keep the migrant “problem” south of the Mediterranean in third-party states. 
 
Even the suspension of Schengen by certain member states, and the subsequent alarm this 
has caused those who see Schengen and the freedom of movement it affords European 
citizens as a fundamental right (one that transmits a certain liberal narrative about Europe 
beyond its frontiers), is in and of itself nothing new. Since its conception in 1985 and its 
implementation during the mid-1990s, Schengen has only ever been partly implemented. 
Individual member states have always had the power to suspend Schengen and between 
1995 and Denmark’s reintroduction of border controls on 11 May, I have counted 67 
separate occasions that Schengen member states have temporarily suspended freedom of 
movement and have re-introduced border controls. My list is by no means necessarily 
accurate; there may be many more times, as there is no systematic official EU record of 
instances where Schengen is suspended, something that in and of itself says a lot about how 
the Schengen Agreement and the freedom of movement it provides, is a central part of an 
important narrative for the European Union about what the EU is and what the EU means. 
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In that sense, the European Union or Schengenland should not be confused with a Europe 
where borders no longer exist. The French re-introduction of border checks earlier this 
year is not that surprising when one considers that France maintained border checks on its 
Benelux frontier from 1995-1998 due to French misgivings over the Netherlands drugs 
policy. In fact, according to my calculations, since 1995 and including the re-instatement of 
border checks at Ventimiglia, France has suspended Schengen eighteen times.  
 
There are many justifications given for the 67 suspensions I have counted; however, most 
can be said to fall into three categories:  
1. large scale sporting events such as the football World and European cups and 
concerns over hooliganism; 
2. high level political summits, like the G8 or European Union summits, where there is 
a fear of political activism; 
3. the curtailment of free movement for non-EU citizens/migrants within 
Schengenland. 
Schengen, in this sense, is like many things within the European Union: a policy whose 
power comes from the idea it articulates rather than any tangible, fixed reality in the day-to-
day practice of European politics. 
 
Consolidation 
 
Schengen has always been about removing internal borders and strengthening external 
ones. Since the implementation of Schengen in 1995 that has seen the removal of internal 
borders between signatory states a simultaneous program of strengthening Schengenland’s 
external borders has been underway. The European Commission for years has sought to get 
member states to agree to a standardization of external border policy across the Union and 
this crisis has presented the Commission with the perfect opportunity to finally push for 
further consolidation of its European border policy. Such a policy also chimes with the 
desires of certain member states, especially those (Italy, Malta, and Greece) that find 
themselves responsible for the policing of part of Schengenland’s southern border. These 
states have for many years been calling for greater “solidarity” amongst member states over 
issues of trans-Mediterranean migration. So any standardization and strengthening of 
external border policy across the EU would benefit these states who claim that they have 
unfairly, due to geographical misfortune, had to shoulder the burden of migrants from the 
south who successfully make it north into Europe.  
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The Commission published a hastily produced “Communication on Migration” on May 4 
that very clearly sets out the Commission’s plans for further consolidation of pre-existing 
border policy and crudely uses the events in North Africa as a foundation on which to 
outline such policy plans. The introductory paragraph starts off thus: “The events in the 
Southern Mediterranean…” and the second paragraph continues with “These events of 
historic proportion in the Southern Mediterranean have confirmed the need for a strong and 
common EU policy in the field of migration and asylum.” As such, the panic that the 
Commission is expressing at individual member states’ desires to re-introduce border 
controls is somewhat Janus-faced, as it too – like individual member states, especially those 
on the southern frontier – is using such fears to pursue its own policy of border 
consolidation.  
 
When the Commission says in the introduction to its “Communication on Migration” that 
“…the need to address this challenging and evolving situation should not lead to a short-
term approach limited to border control without taking account of longer-term issues,” it is 
saying three things: 
1. We are prepared to exploit the current issue of migration from Tunisia and Libya. 
2. States should not act independently of the EU and unilaterally suspend Schengen as 
this damages the perceived power of the Union itself. 
3. The longer-term issues that we need to take account of are the Commission’s plans 
for a further consolidation of our external border policy and a standardization of 
border policy across the Schengen bloc. 
Interestingly, since I began writing this piece, the Commission on 26 May, proposed new 
measures for what it calls “managing immigration fairly and effectively” that build on the 4 
May Communiqué and make much of the ongoing situation in North Africa and it’s impact 
on the EU’s migration policy. 
 
So the Commission is on the one hand spreading panic about migration and on the other 
spreading panic about unilateral action at the individual state level and the “End of 
Schengen,” both of which serve to bolster the Commission’s calls, which have been ongoing 
since 1995, for further consolidation of the Union’s external borders. As an aside, it is 
interesting to note the parallel timelines for the both the implementation of Schengen and 
the increased engagement with states to the south of the Mediterranean, starting with the 
Barcelona Process. In fact, the Commission is being downright disingenuous, pouring oil 
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onto an already panic driven bonfire when it cries “End of Schengen.” In its own 
Communiqué the Commission states clearly that a mechanism for the suspension of 
Schengen may need to be introduced when Schengenland finds itself under such migratory 
pressures. Importantly, though, it states that such a mechanism should be drafted and 
implemented at the European level. All of this suggests that the Commission has used the 
apparent crisis over migration amidst the North African revolutions to ensure that Europe’s 
border policy is consolidated, and not only consolidated but consolidated on its terms. 
 
If one were a cynic, one might also think that Italy’s decision to relieve itself of the burden 
of migrants and “share the problem” with the rest of Europe by issuing temporary residents 
visas was a way of forcing the hands of not only the Commission but also other member 
states into agreeing to a standardization and consolidation of external border policy. The 
reintroduction of border checks by France was almost inevitable following the Italian’s 
decision to “share the problem,” and the French response has been something that the 
Commission has gained maximum traction out of while at the same time crying foul and 
stressing that we were witnessing the “End of Schengen.” 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As has been suggested, EU foreign policy has always been more about the creation and 
consolidation of the EU itself than any effective policy for real structural engagement and 
change or any real recognition of the component parts of European policy towards 
outsiders, both inside Europe’s borders and outside. Taking the suspension of Schengen as 
an example, we see that such a move is being viewed as detrimental to the EU’s image 
abroad, with critics claiming it suggests that the EU and its member states are failing to 
extend European solidarity, and to externalize a set of liberal-democratic norms, to those 
suffering from violence abroad. Such a sentiment only goes so far, however, when one 
considers that for years Europe has sought to bolster its southern border, doing deals with 
and selling weapons to the likes of Gaddafi and Ben Ali, a form of solidarity that I, and I 
suspect many others, do not recognize as such. In fact, only days before Ben Ali got on a 
flight out of Tunis, France was offering to send French riot police to help quell the 
demonstrations.  
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And yet the attempts to express solidarity with the people of North Africa rising up against 
dictatorship in search of democracy is entirely in keeping with the EU’s externalization of a 
set of norms that it has sought to promote throughout the Barcelona Process, a set of norms 
that help to define “what” the EU actually is, while the seemingly contradictory 
securitization and consolidation of Europe’s external borders help to define “where” Europe 
is and “who” is European. This process is nothing new; the need to define in relation to the 
“other” is no longer revelatory to anyone with even a passing knowledge of post-colonial 
critiques. However, while bloody fighting still continues across Libya and NATO bombs 
rain down on Tripoli, why care about European responses to migration from North Africa? 
Because they tell us a lot more about the state of European “liberal” thought and practice 
than any interruption by a bare-chested Bernard-Henri Lévy. It seems that nothing has 
really changed from the times of European colonialism in North Africa. We Europeans can 
use your space, we can profit from your markets, we can control your people and we can 
even unleash deadly violence upon you, but you may not come here; your place is there on 
the southern shore of the Mediterranean, in Africa. This is Europe: entry denied. 
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